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Since  the adoption of the doi moi or renovation  policy in 1986,  Vietnam has been undergoing
a transition from central planning  to a socialist  market oriented economy. This has translated
into strong economic  growth, led by the industrial sector which has expanded at more than
13% per annum over the period 1993-97.  There is a concern, however, among policymakers
in Vietnam that employment  growth has lagged  behind.
This paper examines this concern using new employment data from the Vietnam Living
Standard Survey (VLSS 2) which was completed in 1997-98.  Data from this survey can be
compared  with information  from the first household survey undertaken in Vietnam in 1992-
93.
Part I of the paper shows that over the period 1993-97  industrial  employment  has grown at an
average of about 4% per year, which is low compared to industrial GDP growth. This is
mainly due to the capital-intensive  and import-substituting  nature of the State sector and of
foreign  investment, which  dominate industry. The  labor-intensive and  export-oriented
domestic  private sector, although  growing  quickly,  is still small.
In the future, however, growth promises to be more labor-intensive  than in the past. Prior to
the Asian crisis there were signs of  an emerging export-oriented sector. Using previous
statistical  analysis  by Wood and Mayer (1998)  as well as factor content calculations,  part II of
the paper estimates  that given Vietnam's  endowment  of natural and human  resources there is
scope for  Vietnam to  triple  its  manufacturing exports and  create around  1.6 million
manufacturing  jobs in export sectors in the near future.
Part III of the paper looks at Vietnam's  labor  regulations.  It concludes  that there is no need for
fundamental labor market reforms. At  current levels, minimum wages  and non-wage
regulations (even if better enforced) are unlikely to inhibit the development of the private
sector or  hurt  export competitiveness. A  restrictive interpretation of  the Labor Code's
provisions on employment  termination  may nonetheless hurt foreign investment,  reduce the
speed of reforms in the State sector, and slow the reallocation of resources to the private
sector.
2INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the doi moi or renovation  policy in 1986, Vietnam has been
undergoing  a transition from central  planning  to a socialist  market oriented  economy.  Among
other reforms,  this has involved  an expansion  of the private sector  and the gradual opening  up
of Vietnam's economy to  international  trade and foreign investment. These changes have
made a significant contribution  to economic growth. Over the period 1993-97,  Vietnam has
been one of the fastest growing economy on the planet, with GDP increasing at a rate of
almost 9% per year. This growth was led by the industrial sector  which expanded  at 13% per
annum. However, despite  such  impressive achievements, there  is  a  concern  among
policymakers  in Vietnam that growth  has been "unbalanced"  and that it has only had a modest
impact  on employment.
The first part of this paper examines  this concern  using new employment  data from the
second  Vietnam Living Standard Survey (VLSS 2) which was  completed in  1997-98.
Information from this survey can be compared to the data from the first  Vietnam Living
Standard Survey  (VLSS  1)  conducted in  1992-93. The  paper  shows that  industrial
employment  growth has indeed  been low compared  to industrial  GDP growth. Section I also
documents  Vietnam's export  growth in recent years. It indicates  that, prior to the Asian crisis,
trade reforms had put the country on the road to export-led  growth. Section II uses previous
statistical evidence from Wood and Mayer (1998) to  estimate the  extent of  Vietnam's
untapped comparative advantage in manufacturing  exports. It finds that there is scope for
Vietnam to significantly  increase such exports  in the near future  through a better allocation  of
its resources. Estimates based on factor content calculations  show how labor would benefit
from such export-led growth. Section III of the paper looks at whether Vietnam's labor
regulations present any major constraint for the development  of an export-oriented  private
sector.
3I. The pattern of growth
a) Growth  and Employment
Vietnam is a poor country.  In 1997, its GDP per capita was only $313. However, in
the years before the Asian  crisis, Vietnam  was one of the 10 fastest  growing economies  on the
planet (Economist, 1998).  Table I shows that the average annual growth rate over the 5 years
period 1993-1997  was a spectacular 8.9%, led by the industrial sector where value-added
increased at an average rate of 13.4%  per year. In the same time, services  have grown at 9.4%
a year, while agriculture  has lagged somewhat  behind  with an annual expansion  of 4.3%. This
pattern of growth has led to a quick increase in the share of industry in GDP, from an
estimated 27.3%  in  1992 to  33.1% in  1997. This  is  a  typical  and  nearly universal
characteristic  of the structural  transformation  that accompanies  economic development  (see,
for example,  Chenery  and Syrquin,  1975).
Table 1: The industrialization  of Vietnam
Average annual  Estimated  Share in total
real  GDP  share  in total  output  in
growth  over  output  in  1997  (%)
1993-97  (%)  1992  (%)
TOTAL  8.9  100  100
Agriculture  4.3  31.6  25.2
Industry  13.4  27.3  33.1
Industry  less  construction  13.1  20.7  24.7
Services  9.4  41.1  41.7
Source: Calculations  based  on GSO,  1997  Yearbook  (1998)
Notes:  Agriculture  includes  Agriculture,  Forestry  and Fishery; Industry includes Mining and
Quarrying, Manufacturing,  Utilities and Construction; Shares in 1992 GDP are estimated
backwards  using the GSO new 1994  prices series and real growth rates for 1993  and 1994.
In  general,  such  a  transformation  is  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  increase  in
industrial  employment.  Cross-country  evidence  indicates  that  between  1965  and  1983
developing  countries  experienced  on average  a growth elasticity  of employment  in industry of
about 0.6. That is, industrial employment  expanded at around 60% of the rate of industrial
growth (see Gillis et al.,  1990). More recently, during the late  1980s and early  1990s,
individual countries such as Indonesia were able to raise industrial employment at annual
rates above 80% of their industrial growth (see Agrawal, 1996). In Vietnam, however,
industrial growth has only had a moderate  impact on employment.  As can be seen in table 2,
the growth rate of industrial employment  between 1992/93 and 1997/98 was 4% per year.
Although respectable,  this represents less than 30% of the rate of industrial output growth.
Thus, as table 3 shows, the share of industrial  employment  in total employment  has increased
only little, from 11.8%  to 13.1%.
4Strikingly,  when  construction  is  excluded  from the  Industry  sector,  the  record  is
worse.  Although  non-construction  output  growth  was  more  than  13%  a  year,  annual
employment  growth was as low  as 2.6%. Thus,  given a  growth elasticity  of employment
below 0.2, the share of this segment of the industrial sector in total employment has remained
virtually unchanged'.
Table 2: Industrial  employment  growth  has been moderate
1992/93  1997/98  Absolute  % increase  Incremental
increase  per year  Employment
92/93  - 92/93  - Distribution
97/98  97/98  92/93-97/98
Total employment  36,792,448  40,313,856  3,521,408  1.8  100
Agriculture  26,182,850  26,770,068  587,218  0.4  16.7
Industry  4,343,946  5,296,240  952,294  4.0  27.0
Industry  less construction  3,804,677  4,325,204  520,527  2.6  14.8
Services  6,265,650  8,247,549  1,891,899  5.6  56.3
Source:  VLSS 1 and 2. Employment  data is for people between  15 and 65.
Table 3: The share  of industry  in total employment  is increasing  slowly
Share in total labor  Share  in total labor  Change
force in 92/93 (%)  force  in 97/98 (%)  92/93-
97/98
Agriculture  71.2  66.4  -4.7
Industry  11.8  13.1  +1.3
Industry less  construction  10.3  10.7  +0.4
Services  17.0  20.5  +3.4
Source:  VLSS I and 2
Table 4 shows that over the period 1993-97 economic growth has raised the country's
real  value-added  per  worker  by  39.8%.  In  Industry,  strong  growth  coupled  with  weak
employment  growth  has  been  accompanied  by  a  large  54%  increase  in  average  labor
productivity.  In  agriculture  and  services,  value-added  per  worker  has  increased  by
respectively 20.8% and 19.2%. Thus, the productivity gap between industry and other sectors
has  sharply widened.  In only  five years, agricultural  labor productivity  has  declined  from
about 27% of industrial levels to less than 21%.
I Note  however  that  the VLSS  employment  data  used  in  this  section  provides  a less  somber  picture  than
employment  data  from  Vietnam's  General  Statistical  Office  (GSO,  Statistical  Yearbooks).  According  to GSO
data,  the average  annual  growth  of industrial  employment  was  3.1%  instead  of 4.0%  as indicated  by VLSS  data.
This  would  represent  only  23%  of  the rate  of industrial  growth.  In addition,  when  construction  is omitted  GSO
indicates  employment  growth  of  only  1.7%  or 13%  of  this  sector's  GDP  growth.  Official  data  from  GSO  thus
paints  an excessively  negative  picture.
5Table  4: The  strong industrial  productivity  growth
Value-added/worker




Industry  less  construction  63.0
Services  19.2
Source: Calculations  based  on GSO  (1998)  for  output  in
current  prices  and  on VLSS  I and 2 for employment  data
b) The Industrial Sector
Table 5 shows that in industry both the State and the domestic non-state sectors have
grown  rapidly (by 10.2%  and 9.2%  per annum  respectively)  over the period 1995-98.  In terms
of size, however, the State sector still dwarfs  the private sector. In 1998, its contribution  to
industrial value-added  was more than twice as large as that of the domestic private sector.
Accordingly, a large share of the recent industrial expansion is due to  State enterprises.
Indeed, table 5 shows that between 1995  and 1998 State  companies  have accounted  for 37.2%
of Vietnam's total industrial growth, compared to  16.2% for domestic private companies
(foreign  investment  is discussed  in the next section).
The State sector's  contribution  to employment,  however, is much smaller. In 1997/98,
it provided  jobs for less than 25% of industrial  workers.  This contrasts  with the domestic  non-
state sector  which, despite its smaller  size, employed  more  than 64% of industrial  workers.  As
can be seen in Table 5, a large proportion  of these workers are in household enterprises.  But
registered "private  and mixed companies"  are also much more labor-intensive  than the State
sector. Although accounting only for 7.9% of industrial GDP in  1998, these companies
employed  more workers  than State-owned  enterprises.
This picture shows that Vietnam's slow employment  growth reflects the large State
sector's  strong  growth but low labor  intensity,  and the private sector's  small size (but not slow
growth). One may thus look at Vietnam's poor employment  performance as being the by-
product of a transition period in which both the State sector and private enterprises grow,
albeit from a different  base. On the other hand, State enterprises,  which are still concentrated
in import-substituting  activities and sheltered from both foreign and domestic competition,
typically draw capital and other resources away from the private sector. This may have
prevented  higher  rates of private sector  growth (and thus employment  growth), and/or  may do
so more substantially  in the future.
6Table 5: The State  sector  is big in production,  but small in employment
Industrial  Share in  Share in  Share in
growth  (%)  Industrial  industrial  industrial
1995-98  growth  (%)  GDP  (%)  employment
1995-98  1998  1997/98  (%)
State sector  10.2  37.2  46.2  24.2
Foreign investment  22.7  46.5  31.8  11.5
Domestic  non State sector  9.2  16.2  22.0  64.3
Of which
-Private  and mixed  21.6  11.1  7.9  25.2
-Collective  8.7  0.3  0.6  1.3
-Households  4.0  4.7  13.5  37.8
Source:  column 1 and 2 are from GSO (1999);  column  3 is from VLSS 2
c) The domestic private manufacturing sector
So far in Vietnam there are only 457 private domestic manufacturers with more than
100 full-time workers  (MPDF,  1999). As can be seen in table 6, most of these  companies
operate in labor-intensive sectors (mainly in textiles and garments or in primary processing),
specializing along the lines of the country's comparative advantage. They export on average
around three quarters of their production. This contrasts sharply with State enterprises, where
only about  12% of production  is exported (according to  information from the Ministry  Of
Finance).  Thus,  while  the  capital-intensive  State  sector is  mainly  inward-looking,  export
markets are clearly the main engine of private sector growth.
Table 6: Private manufacturers are labor-intensive and export-oriented
Number  of firms  Share of total  Exports/output  (%)
firns (%)  (unweighted  average)
Garments  and Textiles  159  34.8  80.5
Food and Beverages  71  15.5  63.2
Wood  Products  65  14.2  75.1
Other  Non-metallic  Products  39  8.5  73.2
Leather  Products  34  7.4  85.0
Rubber and Plastic Products  22  4.8  75.0
Basic Metals  9  1.9  n.a.
Chemical  Products  9  1.9  20.0
Others  49  10.7  74.4
TOTAL  457  100  75.3
Source:  Data from MPDF  (1999)
Under  what  conditions  do  domestic  private  companies  compete  in  international
markets  and  whom  do  they  employ?  A  visit  to  factories  in  Haiphong  shows  that  many
Vietnamese  private  companies  producing  garments  or  footwear  for  export  operate  as
subcontractors for foreign companies located abroad, which later re-export their products to
Europe  and  to the U.S. This  means that many foreign  investors  associate themselves  with
domestic firms without  formally registering as joint-ventures.  Given the present dual pricing
system in Vietnam  -which requires foreign investors to pay higher prices for land, utilities,
labor, and transportation-  this  substantially reduces production  costs. In addition,  it avoids
7lengthy, cumbersome  and costly bureaucratic  procedures.  How does the association work?
The foreign  partners provide  the technology  (sewing  machines and know how), the material
inputs (imported duty free from abroad), and the markets. Vietnamese  companies,  on their
side, do the labor-intensive  part of the job: workers  cut the inputs and sew them together. On
average, they get paid around $1 per pair of shoes or cloth worth sometimes up to $70 on
OECD  markets.  This covers costs but leaves  little opportunity  for profits and investment.
Managers of Vietnamese  companies  contend that such a situation will endure until
they can break free from Asian partners  and export directly  to the EU or the U.S. This will
require both information  about foreign  markets and -especially- access to credit in order to
afford technology, buy inputs, and set up a budget for design and marketing.  Almost all
managers  point towards  the need for Vietnam's  Government  to establish  a fair access  to credit
for the private sector  and abolish  the lending  bias in favor of SOEs. Current  land policies also
contribute  to starve  the private sector of resources.  Land cannot  be bought and land-use  rights
are expensive and cannot be presented as collateral in the banking system. Thus, so far,
Vietnam's  private exporting companies  -whether  joint ventures  or domestic limited liability
companies-  heavily depend  upon their foreign  partners.
Whom  do private manufacturers  employ? In rapidly  developing  Asian countries,  jobs
in footwear  or clothing  often go to young women  with primary education  only -thus offering
employment  opportunity  for the poor or near-poor.  In Haiphong,  most jobs also go to young
women. Typically,  between 80% and 90% of workers are women aged between 18 and 25
years. But, most of these workers  have completed  secondary  education  (grade 12), meaning
that they are overqualified  even if lacking any vocational  training. According  to managers,
such high education levels are not required and primary education would in principle be
enough. All that is required  in the footwear  or garment  sector  is generally  some basic sewing
skills. However,  since both educated and uneducated  workers apply for the jobs, the more
educated  are chosen. This situation is unfortunate  both for educated  women who should be in
more productive jobs  and for workers with little education whose job  opportunities are
reduced. It is but one effect of an undersized private sector which results in weak labor
demand.
c) Foreign Investment
The adoption of the 1987 Law on Foreign Investment  and subsequent amendments
have established  an "open-door"  policy for foreign  investors  and have increasingly  simplified
investment  procedures.  This gradual  improvement  in the investment  climate has led to a large
increase in foreign  capital inflows,  mainly from Asian countries.  Table 7 shows that over the
period 1993-97,  the inflow of disbursed  foreign  investment  has increased  by almost 46% per
annum  (in terms of current  dollars),  reaching  roughly $2.1  billion during 1997.
8Table 7: The sharp increase in foreign investment
FDI  FDI  Annual growth
Inflows  Inflows  of FDI inflows
1992  1997  1993-97  (%/6)
Total disbursed  FDI ($ million)  316  2,074  45.7
-Agriculture,  forestry  and fishery  3.9%  13.7%  87.3
-Heavy  industry,  construction,  oil & gas  31.4%  27.7%  42.1
-Light and food industry  7.9%  22.8%  80.0
-Services,  real estate,  transport  &  56.8%  35.8%  32.8
communication
Source:  IMF (1999);  annual growth  of foreign  investment  (FDI) inflows  is in current  dollars
Most of this foreign investment is capital-intensive. Although table 7 above indicates
that  the  share  of  FDI  flowing  into  light  industry  has  increased  in  recent  years,  most
investmnent  entered oil-related production, heavy industry or real estate. Table 8 shows that by
the  end of  1998, less than  13% of the total  stock of FDI was in the  labor-intensive  light
industrial sector, where about 80% of production is exported (according to information from
the Ministry of Planing and Investment). Strikingly, even within the non-oil industrial sector,
more  than  half  of the  investments  are in  heavy industry.  This  shows that  the amount  of
export-oriented  and labor-intensive  foreign  investment attracted  by  Vietnam's high human
capital and low labor  costs is still modest. It  is thus unsurprising  that foreign  investment,
although accounting for  31.8% of industrial production in 1998 and accounting for almost
half of industrial growth over the period 1995-98, still employs only 11.5% of all  industry
workers (see table 5).
Table 8: The small sbare of investment in light industry
FDI stock by
08.1998
Total disbursed  capital  (million  $)  10,139
Shares in total disbursed  capital (%)
Heavy  Industry  24.1
Oil & Gas  22.2
Light Industry  12.4
Services,  Transport  & Communication  10.3
Real Estate  17.8
Others  13.1
Source:  IMF, 1999
This structure of foreign investment at least partly reflects Vietnam's high barriers to
heavy industrial imports, which  not only  protect State enterprises but also  attracts foreign
investors into import-substituting and capital-intensive activities, often in joint ventures with
State companies. It has been estimated that more than 70% of foreign investment occurs in
sectors with  effective rates  of protection  above 50% (CIE,  1998). In particular,  Vietnam's
tight  quotas  on  steel and  cement-related  imports  provide  an  incentive  for  multinational
companies  to establish their production in local plants. Such form of foreign  investmnent  is
generally inefficient.  It creates local monopolies and raises the price  of products relative to
those that would have prevailed under free imports. Thus, although foreign investment has
boosted local production it has done little to create employment. Improving the climate for
9export-oriented  foreign investors would certainly help propel Vietnam towards more labor-
intensive  growth.
Of course, foreign  investment  also creates indirect  jobs through forward and backward
linkages -in  particular through construction,  services, and subcontracting  relationships. The
number  of jobs created in such way is impossible  to assess accurately  but is usually estimated
at around 1.5 times the number of employees  directly  hired by foreign  enterprises (see Aaron
and Andeya, 1998). Even so, the labor market impact of foreign investment  would remain
low. The capital intensive nature of foreign investment  tends to minimize both employment
creation  and spillovers  into the rest of the economy.
d) Manufacturing  exports and the Asian crisis
Despite the capital-intensive  nature of much of Vietnamn's  growth, there have been
encouraging signs in the last few years of the emergence  of a labor-intensive  export sector.
Changes in trade policies have been an essential component  of the doi moi policy adopted by
the Government  of Vietnam in 1986. Such changes  have been implemented  on several fronts.
Most importantly, licensed private companies have been allowed to  engage directly in
international  trade, breaking  the trade monopoly  of a small  number  of State-owned  enterprises
operating under central or  provincial authorities. However, until very recently, private
enterprises had to satisfy a number of fairly restrictive conditions to obtain the necessary
licenses. The recent removal of trade licensing,  allowing  companies to freely engage in trade
within  the  registered scope  of  their  business activities, should  further improve the
environment for export-oriented  industries.  In addition, over the years, most export quotas
have been lifted and export taxes have been reduced  to generally  very low levels (CIE, 1998
and UNDP, 1999b).
These reforms -together with  sound macroeconomic management- have allowed
Vietnam  to start exploiting  its comparative  advantage  in labor-intensive  manufactures,  putting
the country on track for export-led  growth.  As can be seen in table 9, between 1992 and 1997
the dollar value of imports and exports has roughly quadrupled,  increasing  the share of trade
in GDP from about 52% to 86%. This is a high level by international  standards. Table 10
shows that Vietnam's export growth was led by an impressive  surge in light manufacturing
exports,  which in real terms grew by no less than 45% a year and whose share in total exports
rose from 13.5%  in 1992  to 36.7% in 1997.  Also remarkable  is the strong  rise in the value of
agricultural exports, which mainly reflects the  spectacular take  off in  rice and  coffee
production. In only few years Vietnam turned  from being a net rice importer into the world's
second largest exporter  with over 3.5 million  tons in 1998.
Table 9: The high share of trade in GDP
1992  1997
Value  of exports  (million  $)  2,581  9,185
Value of imports  (million $)  2,540  11,592
(Exports  + Imports)/  GDP  51.6%  85.7%
Source:  GSO (1998)
10Table 10: Export  growth  has been led by light manufactures
Estimated  Share in total  Share in total
average  annual  Exports in 1992  Exports in 1997
real growth  (%)  (%)
1992-97  (%)
Total exports  18.8  100  100
Agriculture  11.1  49.5  35.3
Heavy industry  and minerals  12.3  37  28
Light Industry  45.1  13.5  36.7
Of which:
-textiles and garments  16.4
-footwear  10.6
Source:  World Bank (1998), GSO  (various)  and General  Department  of Customs
Note: Row 1 is estimated  by converting  exports in current  US$ from GSO (1998) to constant  Dong
by using exchange  rates from World  Bank (1998) and the GDP deflator  from GSO (1998).
This  performance  in  manufacturing  exports  was  supported  by  foreign  investment.
Vietnam's  trade  and  taxation  regimes  now  contain  special  provisions  that  allow  export-
oriented foreign enterprises to import duty free intermediate goods from abroad and to enjoy
preferential tax rates. In addition, many joint ventures are also exempted  from import duties
on equipment goods, machine components, spare parts, and transport equipment and materials
(CIE, 1998). Table  11 shows that the dollar value of exports by foreign invested companies -
about  40% of which  stem from  light manufacturing-  has  grown by  80% per  year between
1992 and  1997 (albeit from  a small base).  This has raised the  share of exports by  foreign
invested companies from less than 4% to almost 20% of total exports in 1997.
Table 11: FDI accounts  for a growing  share  of Vietnam's  exports
1994  1997
Total exports by foreign  161.1  1,790
companies  ($ million)
Total light industrial  exports by  n.a.  728
foreign  companies  ($ million)
Share of FDI in total exports  (%)  3.9  19.5
Share of FDI in light industry  exports (%/O)  n.a.  21.6
Source:  Line 1, and 3 GSO, line 2 and 4 estimation  from MPI data
The Asian  crisis has  interrupted these  encouraging  trends.  In 1998,  foreign  direct
investment  to  Vietnam  fell  from  $2.0 billion  in  1997 to  less  than  $800  million,  with  an
estimated decline of $612 million in light industry (IMF, 1999). As can be seen in table 12, in
1998 real  manufacturing  export  earnings  grew  by  less than  1%. Had  light manufacturing
exports earnings continued to grow at their five years average pre-crisis rate of 45% per year,
Vietnam  might  have  exported  an additional  $1.2 billion  of  light manufacturing  exports  in
1998. Fortunately,  table  12 also shows that as far as manufacturing  exports  are concerned
Vietnam is recovering  from the worst impact of the crisis. In the first 8 months of 1999, total
exports have staged a strong come back. And while the decline in agricultural prices on world
11markets may have more enduring effects, the manufacturing  sector may quickly be able to
restore  high levels of export  growth.
Table  12: Is the crisis over?
Real growth  Nominal  growth  Nominal  growth (%)
In 1998  (%)  In 1998  (%)  8 months 1998  -
(constant  97  (dollar value)  8 months 1999
Dong value)  (dollar value)
Total exports  1.0  2.4  18.1
-Agriculture  6.6  7.6  5.2
-Oil and mining  -12.9  -12.2  35.0
-Manufactures  0.6  1.6  30.7
Source:  General  Departnent of customs
n. Looking  towards  the future:  Vietnam's  potential  for export-led  growth
The low  growth  elasticity  of  employment  in  industry  -i.e. the  fact  that  industrial
growth generates few jobs- is typical of countries that have promoted capital-intensive  and
local market oriented industrialization  (see Krueger, 1983). Indeed, as documented  above,
capital-intensive  industries that grow behind high import barriers offer few employment
opportunities  for a developing  country's  labor  force.  By contrast,  during the last three decades,
countries that have followed export oriented growth strategies  were able to raise industrial
employment  at annual  rates close  to 80% of their industrial  growth  (see for example  Gillis et
al., 1990).  In labor abundant  countries,  export-led  growth policies  which rely on comparative
advantage  are instrumental  not only for generating  strong and sustainable  growth but also for
establishing  a labor-intensive,  employment  generating,  pattern of growth. This raises the two
following  interrelated  questions:  to what extent is Vietnam's  export  potential under-exploited
and could Vietnam move towards a labor-intensive  and export-led  pattern of growth in the
near future?
a) Trade Theory
Recent evidence has  shown that the composition of a country's exports is to  a large
extent  determined by  its availability of natural and hunan  resources (see Wood and Berge,
1997, Owens and Wood, 1997,  or Wood and Mayer, 1998).  This confirms  the predictions of
the Heckscher-Ohlin  trade theory, according  to which the composition  of exports in open
market economies is largely influenced  by a country's  endowment  in factors of production.
The theory predicts  that countries  tend to export the kind of goods whose  production  requires
an intensive use of their relatively  abundant  -and thus cheap-  resources.
In particular,  the higher a country's  availability  of skilled labor relative to land, the
larger its share of manufactures  in exports.  This is because  the production  of manufactures  is
skill-intensive and  primary production is  land-intensive. That  is,  the  production of
manufactures  requires many educated workers and little land, while the reverse is true in
agriculture. Thus, countries that have a large pool of well-educated workers and  little land
have a comparative  advantage  in manufactures.  Indeed,  a high endowment  of skill per worker
and a low availability  of land should be associated with a high share of manufacturing  to
primary exports. On the other hand, a high endowment  of land and a low availability of
skilled workers is expected  to be associated  with a high share of primary to manufacturing
exports.
12b) Vietnam  's export  structure  and resource  endowment  in comparative  perspective
Table 13 compares Vietnam's resource endowments with those of a number of other
countries in East and South East Asia. It shows that Vietnam has a high endowment of skilled
labor and relatively  little land. In  1990, the latest year  for  which  data is available for  all
countries listed  in table  14, Vietnam's workers had  an estimated  average of 6.28 years of
education.  This  was  close  to  the  regional  average  and  was  above  the  levels  of  China,
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. It shows Vietnam's impressive effort to build up human
capital. In addition, table  13 shows that Vietnam's availability of land relative  to  its adult
population is low. In 1990, Vietnam had more workers per square kilometer of land than most
other countries in the region,  including the four countries mentioned above.  Such resource
endowments form the basis of a very strong comparative advantage in manufactures.
Looking  at  table  13,  it  is  clear,  however,  that  much  of  Vietnam's  comparative
advantage is still untapped. In  1997, manufactures accounted for  only 36.7% of Vietnam's
total exports. This is the lowest share of all the East and South-East Asian countries listed in
table  13. In  China, for  example, manufactures represented  86.7% of exports, while  in the
whole of East Asia they made up  on average 83% of total exports. Even a  decade ago, all
these  countries  (except  Indonesia)  had  more  manufacturing  goods  in  their  exports  than
Vietnam  in  1997.  Most  relevant,  however,  is  a  comparison  between  Vietnam  and  the
Philippines. The Philippines has an endowment of resources similar to that of Vietnam, but its
exports in 1997 consisted of 87.6% of manufactures. This suggest that Vietnam is well within
its potential  and  that  there  is  scope  for  Vietnam  to  significantly  increase  manufacturing
exports in the near future.
Table  13:  Export  structure  and resource  endowments
Country  Share  of manufactures  Average  years  Square  km of land
in total  export revenues  of education  per 100  workers in
1990  Latest  year*  in 1990  1990
Vietnam  n.a  36.7  6.28  0.75
China  72.9  86.7  5.9  1.14
Hong Kong  95.8  95.6  9.2  0.02
Indonesia  35.7  55.4  4.6  1.60
Korea  92.8  88.1  9.9  0.31
Malaysia  54.8  78.5  6.0  3.00
Philippines  67.5  87.6  6.9  0.80
Singapore  72.6  86.9  5.9  0.03
Taiwan,  China  92.7  94.3  8.0  0.24
Thailand  60.5  73.3  5.6  1.36
Average  71.7  82.9  6.88  0.94
(excluding
Vietnam)
* All latest year data is from 1997.  The only exceptions  are Singapore  for which data is for
1998 and Taiwan  for which it refers  to 1996
Source: For all countries, except Vietnam:  export data is from COMTRADE.  Manufactures
refer to categories 5-8 less 68 of the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC); Education and population data are from Barro and Lee (1996) and land
13data is from World Bank (World  Development  Report,  various); average years
of  education is  the  average number of  years  of  schooling of  the  adult
population (15 and over) and land per worker is the ratio of land area divided
by the adult population.  For Vietnam  export,  education  and population data are
from the Vietnam General Statistical  Office (GSO); land data is from World
Bank (World  Development  Report, 1995)
c) Vietnam's  exportpotential: an estimate
To what extent is Vietnam's  comparative  advantage  in manufactures  under-exploited?
Using statistical  results by Wood and Mayer (1998)  can give us an idea of the answer. With a
sample  of 115 countries  and data for 1990,  the authors estimated  the following  regression:
(1)  Ln (Xm/Xp)  = -5.11 + 1.47.1n  (skill/worker) - 0.6.1n (land/worker)
(-14.1)  (7.18)  (-6.59) R2=0.56
where  each country's  share of manufactures  relative  to  primary  exports  (Xm/Xp)  is
related to its "human  capital" (skill/worker)  and to its relative endowment  of land and labor
(land/worker).  All variables  are expressed  in natural logs (ln). The coefficients  are significant
at the 1% level and the explanatory  power of the regression  is high; the variables account for
56% of cross-country  differences  in export  composition.
The coefficients obtained from this  regression allow us to  calculate any  single
country's predicted share of manufactures  in total exports on the basis of its human and
natural resources. Applying these coefficients  to Vietnam, whose resource endowments  are
shown in table 13, yields  the following  results:
(2) Predicted  Ln (Xm/Xp)  = -5.11 + 1.47.1n  (6.28)- 0.6.1n  (0.0075)  =0.515
(3)  Predicted Xm/Xp  = exp.(0.515) = 1.673
(4) Predicted  Xm/X  = 1.673/(1  + 1.673)  = 0.63
It appears that Vietnam's predicted earnings from manufacturing  exports (Xm/Xp  in
equation 3) amount  to 167%  of earnings  from primary  exports instead of its actual 58%. Thus,
its predicted  share of manufactures  in total exports (Xm/X  in equation 4) is 63% instead of just
37.6%. In other words, with a more efficient use of its available resources,  Vietnam could be
expected to increase its share of manufactures  in total exports by more than 25 percentage
points.
Of course, these estimates  must be taken with a grain of salt. First, in the analysis of
Wood and Mayer, workers' skills are measured by the average number of years of schooling
of the adult (over-15) population, while natural resources are measured by total land area.
Both  of  these measures are  imperfect. In  particular, average years  of  schooling may
overestimate  the skills of Vietnam's  workers since it does not take into account the quality of
schooling nor skill acquisition  through training or on the job  experience -areas in which
Vietnam are usually considered  to fare poorly compared  to other countries. In addition,  total
land  area does not account  for variation  among  countries  in the quality  of their land  nor in their
oil reserves. Since Vietnam is an oil exporter, total land area may understate Vietnam's
14availability  of natural resources.  For these two reasons,  Vietnam's  true manufacturing  export
potential  may  be somewhat  over-estimated  in the above  calculations.
On the other hand, the above results are obtained with a cross-country  regression
based on 1990  rather  than 1997  data. If anything,  this is likely to lead  to an underestimation  of
Vietnam's true manufacturing  export potential since there tends to be an increase in world
demand  for manufactures  over time (see Wood and Berge, 1997).  Indeed,  it is unlikely  that all
the increase  in East Asian countries  manufacturing  exports between 1990  and 1997 (see table
14) can be fully accounted  for by corresponding  changes  in resource  endowments.
d) The value offuture manufacturing  exports
The above calculations  have shown that there is scope for Vietnam to increase its
manufacturing  exports.  But by how  much? The above  section has focused only on one aspect
of Vietnam's  exports,  namely its commodity  composition.  It has shown that given Vietnam's
resources, manufactures  should quickly  be able to reach around 63% of total exports. What
does this suggest  with respect  to the absolute  value of manufacturing  exports?
Traditional  trade theory generally  assumes  that economies are efficient. This means
that production  is located  on the production  possibility  frontier, such as for example  on point
B in figure 2 below. In such a case, any increase in the production of manufactures  must
occur at the expense of primary production. So, for example, a  movement along the
production possibility frontier from B to point A, leads to an increase in manufacturing
production  but to a fall in primary  production.  Such a shift occurs as a result of an increase  in
relative prices of manufactures.  And, as already emphasized,  it assumes that the initial
allocation of resources is optimal. It would be difficult to argue that this model accurately
reflects  the situation  in Vietnam.
If countries start with an allocation of resources that is sub-optimal,  production  that
takes  place within  the production  possibility  frontier.  If Vietnam's  current  production  is taking
place at a point such as C in figure 2, a better allocation  of resources could increase both
manufacturing  and primary production.  However,  if Vietnam's  initial allocation  of resources
is such that production takes place on point D, there is no scope for increasing primary
production  through a better allocation  of resources.  The dotted line in figure 2 represents  the
production possibility frontier of a country that has reached zero marginal productivity  in
primary production.  Any additional  worker  allocated  to agriculture,  while raising  the number
of people among whom agricultural incomes have to  be  shared, do not contribute any
additional  output.  This happens  when the amount  of land is not large enough to absorb more
than a given share of a country's  workforce.  In such a case, a better allocation  would entail a
movement from D to A along the dotted line, increasing manufacturing  production  while






This last scenario  may plausibly  reflect  Vietnam's  current  situation.  There is currently
a large labor surplus in Vietnam's agriculture,  The average amount of agricultural  land per
capita is less than one tenth of an hectare (ITNDP,  1999a)  and peasants are estimated  to be
working  only 71% of their time (GSO, 1999a). Thus, the agricultural  labor force is already
larger than what the limited available land can absorb. In such circumstances one may
reasonably assume that  marginal labor productivity is  close to  zero, and  that  each
manufacturing  job that is not created  represents,  in the countryside,  one more mouth to feed
with the same rice bowl. This implies  that labor could be drawn from the primary sector into
manufacturing  without substantially  reducing  the production  of primary goods. In addition,
investment  in manufacturing  would presumably  not require a large amount of capital to be
drawn away from agriculture.  Section  I of this paper indicates  that much capital  could merely
be redirected from the capital-intensive  and import-substituted  industrial State enterprises
towards the export-oriented  sector. More capital could also be raised from abroad though
foreign  investment  and through  better mobilization  of savings.
But by how much, then, could manufacturing  exports be expected  to increase through
a better allocation of resources?  Given income from non-manufacturing  export of $5,812.6
million in 1997,  the above calculations  based on the regression by Wood and Mayer (1998)
suggest  that there is scope for Vietnam  to at least triple its manufacturing  exports in the near
future, from $3,372 million to about $9,881  million. This means that Vietnam's still unused
comparative  advantage  in manufactures  can be estimated  to amount  to roughly $6.5 billion,
which represents  about  25% of the country's  1997  GDP or $85  per capita.
e) The  Labor Content  of Vietnam's  untapped  comparative  advantage
How would a better use of Vietnam's  comparative  advantage  in manufactures  translate
into employment  growth? We can get an idea by using the "factor content" method. This
method involves calculating the amount of labor embodied in trade flows. Although not
undisputed,  it has widely been used in studies that estimate the impact of increased trade
flows or of alternative trade strategies on labor demand (see Wood, 1994). Even though it is a
partial equilibrium  analysis, it has  generally been  found to produce  estimates  of the same
order of magnitude as general equilibrium models.
I CThe essential piece of  information that is  required for  these calculations is  an
estimation  of the labor intensity of exports and import substitutes.  The first row in table 14 is
an export weighted  average of gross output  per worker  in three sectors:  garments  and textiles,
footwear  and "other" light industries.  It is based on a survey of 200 State-owned  enterprises
(SOEs) by the Ministry of Finance and shows that each worker produces on average $3,885
worth of output per year. The second row shows similar information for private foreign
companies in light industry.  According  to data from the Ministry of Planning  and Investment,
the average gross output per worker in this sector is slightly higher than in SOEs, reaching
$4,300. Finally, row three is an average between the first two rows. It is the best available
estimate of the labor-intensity  in Vietnam's  exports and indicates that each worker produces
$4,078  worth of output per year.
But when exports increase,  so do imports.  And while  higher exports  create  jobs, higher
imports  tend to displace domestic  workers.  Thus, the last row in table 14 also shows  estimates
of the labor-intensity  in Vietnam's industries  that compete with imports. Due to the lack of
comparable  production and trade data, this sector is assumed  to contain the following  heavy
industries:  chemicals,  machinery  and equipment,  and iron and steel. In these sectors, average
output  per worker is estimated  at $9,200,  indicating  that the export  sector is slightly  more  than
twice as labor-intensive  as import-substituting  enterprises.  This is well in line with previous
estimates in  developing countries and it is  similar to  the situation observed in  Brazil,
Indonesia  or Thailand  in the 1970s  (see Krueger, 1983).  It indicates  that an expansion  of trade
according to the lines of Vietnam's comparative advantage should be beneficial to labor
demand.
Table 14: The labor intensity  of exports  and import  substitutes
Sector  Output/worker
(dollars)
Export  industries  (SOEs)  3,855
Export  industries  (FDI)  4,300
Export  industries  (average)  4,078
Import-substituted  industries  9,200
Source:  Rows  1 and  4 are  calculated  from  a survey  of 191
State-owned  enterprises  by the  Ministry  of Finance.
The  second  row  is calculated  from  data  from  the
Ministry  of Planning  and  Investment.  Row  3 is an
average  between  row  1 and  row  2.
Factor  content calculations  based on table 14 (and shown in Appendix  I) suggest  that a
tripling of Vietnam's manufacturing  exports would create  between 1.5 and 1.7 million direct
jobs in export-oriented  companies,  with a best estimate of 1.6 million  jobs. In addition, if the
production of  domestically purchased intermediates for  export production have  labor
requirements  similar to exporting companies, another 700,000 jobs would also be created
indirectly. Increased imports worth $6.5 billion, on the other hand, are likely to displace
between 200,000 and 350,000  workers  in import-substituting  companies  (with a best estimate
of 260,000). In addition to these workers - essentially  employees  in SOEs- another 400,000
jobs may be lost in firms that produce intermediates  for such import-substituting  companies.
The net positive employment  effect of an additional  $6.5 billion of manufacturing  exports and
imports is thus likely to lie between 1.3 and 1.4 million direct jobs, with another 300,000
indirect  jobs.
17])  How near is the labor-intensive future?
How long will it take to create these  jobs ? This all depends on Vietnam's  ability to
recover from the Asian crisis. Prior to the Asian crisis export growth was very strong. As
pointed out in section I of this paper, had light manufacturing  exports continued  to grow at
their five-year-average  pre-crisis rate of 45% per year, Vietnam might have been able to
export  an additional  $1.2 billion of light manufactures  in 1998  alone. This means  that around
300,000 direct jobs  would have been created in  the manufacturing export sector (see
Appendix  II on the employment  effects  of the Asian crisis).
If such a high export growth  rate had been sustained,  Vietnam might have tripled its
exports in only about 3 years. Thus, labor-intensive  exports would have directly absorbed
more than 500,000 workers per year (on average). Even when allowing for the jobs that
would have been lost due to increased  imports,  this compares  very favorably  to the roughly
200,000  workers  that have annually  entered  employment  in industry  between 1993  and 1997.
It also shows that prior to the Asian crisis Vietnam was on the way towards more labor-
intensive  growth.  However,  even  if exports  grow  at only half their pre-crisis  rates, 5 to 6 years
would be enough for Vietnam to triple its earnings  from manufacturing  exports. In this case,
manufacturing  exports  would generate  on average  around 300,000  direct  jobs every  year. This
suggests that even at reduced export growth rates the future promises to be more labor-
intensive  than the past.
III. Labor  regulations  and private  sector  development
In the future, as Vietnam will move ahead on the road of reform and pursue further
international  integration,  it will have  to ensure the redeployment  of labor both from the public
to the private sector and from protected  sectors into sectors in which it has a comparative
advantage.  In addition, it will have to create the conditions  for a rapid development  of the
private sector.  Thus, this section  looks at whether  Vietnam's  new Labor Code implemented  in
1995  and related  Decrees  are consistent  with these objectives.  Three  types of labor  regulations
are looked at: minimum wages, non-wage compensation,  and laws regulating employment
termination.  The analysis  is mainly based on new VLSS data and on two case studies, one in
export-oriented  companies in Haiphong and another at ABB Transformers,  a joint venture
located  in Hanoi.
III.L Minimum wages
How do minimum  wages affect labor costs and private sector employment  growth?
This depends  on the degree of enforcement  and on the extent to which the minimum  wage is
binding. In  developing countries, enforcement is  often possible  only  in  very  visible
companies,  including  medium  and large export-oriented  firms (see Agrawal, 1996).  In export-
oriented  sectors, effective  minimum  wages  tend to increase  production  costs,  hurt exports  and
therefore reduce employment.  They may also deter foreign investment; in principle, since
many developing countries compete to  attract export-oriented  foreign investors, a  small
difference  in labor costs can have a large impact  on the location  of investmnent.  In theory, a
high minimum  wage may also reduce  employment  -although to a lesser extent- in the inward
oriented formal sector, where higher prices can be passed on to  consumers but where
employers tend to adopt less labor-intensive  production.  Thus, a high minimum wage may
18ultimately increase the number  of workers who seek jobs in the rural and urban household
sector,  increasing  the supply  of labor  where most of the poor are found.
a) Regulations
In Vietnam,  the minimum  wage level is set at different  rates for domestic and foreign
enterprises.  For the domestic sector  -whether private or public- the monthly  minimum  wage
is set at 144,000  VND (about  $10.35)  since January 1997.  In the public  sector,  this minimum
wage is used as the base on which actual salaries  are calculated.  All public sector  wages are a
multiple of the minimum  wage. Thus, any increase  in the minimum  wage leads automatically
to an increase  in all public sector  wages (which  probably  explains  why its level has remained
unchanged  since 1997).  In foreign  companies  and  joint ventures  the minimum  wage is higher.
Until July 1999,  minimum  wages  were denominated  in dollars.  Thus the dollar cost of wages
in foreign  companies  was not affected  by the currency  slide in the previous  years. Nowadays,
these minimum wages are quoted in domestic currency  and are set at 626,000 VND in the
inner districts of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh, 556,000 VND in other large cities and 487,000
VND everywhere else. So for foreign companies, the minimum wage represents between
338% and 435% of the minimum  wage for domestic companies.  How does this affect labor
costs?
b) Evidence:  domestic  companies
For domestic companies,  the minimum  wage is very low. Annually,  it would yield an
income of less than VND 1.73  million.  This falls  below the World  Bank's general  poverty  line
set at VND 1.787 million for 1998 (World  Bank, 1999).  As can be seen in table 17, VLSS
data shows that such a minimum  wage represents  roughly one fourth of Vietnam's average
wage and one third of rural wages. This is modest  by international  standards.  Table 17 also
shows that Vietnam's  minimum  wage is far below average  wages in all types of employmnent,
including small household enterprises. The only exception is for cooperatives,  where the
average wage is only about  25% above  the minimum  wage.
Table  17:  the  minimum  wage  is low  compared  to average  wages
Monthly  Ratio  minimum
Average  wage
wage  To  average  wage
(in Dongs)
Total  522,610  0.276
Total urban  625,420  0.230
Total rural  445,090  0.324
Total males  570,760  0.252
Total females  447,150  0.322
Government  395,650  0.364
State enterprises  629,690  0.229
Cooperatives  182,820  0.788
Private  enterprises  623,430  0.231
Small  household  enterprises  518,390  0.278
Mix  economic  sector  846,540  0.170
Other  495,380  0.291
Source:  VLSS  2 (GSO, 1999)
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piece of information,  one must keep in mind that minimum  wages are designed to increase
earnings  of workers  at the lowest  end of the earnings  distribution.  These  workers  are typically
those with lower levels of education.  Thus, what ultimately  matters is the ratio of minimum
wages to average wages for low educated  and low paid workers.  Table 18 below shows that
even workers with no diploma earn on average more than 3 times the minimum wage. This
reflects the small earnings  differentials  by levels of education  in Vietnam.  As can be seen in
table 18, workers  with upper secondary  education  only earn 20% more than workers  with no
diploma.
Table 18: the minimum  wage is low even for workers  with little education
Monthly  Ratio  of minimum  to
Average  wage  average  wage
(in  Dongs)
No  diploma  486,230  0.30
Primary  diploma  509,430  0.28
Lower  secondary  diploma  497,050  0.29
Upper  secondary  diploma  567,620  0.25
College  and  university  747,840  0.19
Source:  VLSS  2 (GSO,  1999>
Given this paper's focus on Vietnam's  export potential,  the question  as to whether  the
minimum wage is  binding in  the labor-intensive export-oriented  sector is  of particular
interest. A  visit to  Haiphong's export-oriented  garments, footwear and food processing
enterprises  shows  that here again market  wages are above minimum  levels.  In Haiphong, full-
time  workers earn  on  average 300,000 to  550,000 VND  per  month, depending on
productivity.  This is two to four times more than the mandatory  minimum.  The lowest level
of pay that was observed in Haiphong was 10,000 VND a day, which still yields a monthly
income of more than 50% above the minimum  wage. Thus, the minimum  wage is unlikely  to
present any obstacle  to the development  of the export-oriented  domestic  private sector.
c) Evidence:  foreign invested  enterprises
As pointed out above, the minimum  wage for foreign companies is higher than for
domestic enterprises and varies across regions. Table 19 below shows that it represents
between  93% and 106%  of the country's  average  wages,  and between  78% and 89% of private
sector  wages. In both urban and rural areas  the minimum  wage for foreign  companies  is set a
levels roughly equal to average wages. Such ratios of minimum  to average  wages are high.
Table 20 shows that minimum wages are even higher than wages of well-educated  workers,
with upper secondary  diplomas. What about labor-intensive  export sectors?  A case study in
Haiphong (where the minimum wage is set at VND 556,000) shows that the mandatory
minimum wage is about 25% above market wages for the type of workers employed  in the
garment and footwear sectors (Belser, 1999). As pointed out above, the lowest wage level
observed in Haiphong's domestic export-oriented  enterprises was 10,000 VND per day -
which would yield less than 50%  of the mandatory  minimum.
20Table 19: in foreign invested  companies the minimum wage is high
Monthly  Ratio  minimum  wage
Average  wage  To average  wage
(in Dongs)
Total  522,610  0.93 - 1.06
Total urban  625,420  0.89 - 1.00
Total rural  445,090  1.09
Private enterprises  623,430  0.78  - 0.89
100%  FDI  979,550  0.49  - 0.64
Joint ventures  524,180  0.93  - 1.19
Source:  VLSS  2 (GSO, 1999)
Table 20: The minimum wage is higher than wages of skilled workers
Monthly  Ratio minimum  wage
Average  wage  To average  wage
(in Dongs)
No diploma  486,230  1.00- 1.28
Primary diploma  509,430  0.95  - 1.23
Lower  secondary  diploma  497,050  0.98 - 1.26
Upper  secondary  diploma  567,620  0.85 - 1.10
College and university  747,840  0.69  -0.88
Source:  VLSS 2 (GSO, 1999)
To what extent is this minimum wage enforced? According to Vietnam's Ministry of
Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA) minimum salary breaches are widespread in
foreign invested  companies, mainly  in garments, leather tanning, and  paper production, as
well as in agriculture. Interviews in Haiphong showed that some managers of foreign invested
companies or joint ventures have indeed difficulties recalling the level of the minimum wage.
Others  openly admit paying  below  mandatory  minimum. Most visited  foreign  companies,
however, appeared to comply with regulations (Belser, 1999). This is unsurprising given that
foreign invested companies are among the most visible companies, for which monitoring is
easiest.
How does this minimum wage affect employment? In theory there are two channels
through which high labor costs in foreign invested companies can hurt employment. The first
is  by  inducing  companies  to  substitute  capital  for  labor  and  adopt  less  labor-intensive
technologies. No such effect has however been reported by managers of foreign companies in
Haiphong. Foreign companies in export-oriented sectors are mostly subsidiaries which import
raw materials and transform them into finished products. There is thus not much scope for
substituting machines for workers. Shoes and clothes have to be stitched together by workers
and no machines can replace them.
The second and potentially more important channel through which higher labor costs
can  hurt  employment  is  through  reduced  export  competitiveness.  Many  of  Vietnam's
neighbors (in particular Indonesia) have recently experienced large currency devaluations due
to the Asian crisis. This has brought about major reductions in the dollar cost of wages. In
addition,  many  Asian  countries  have  responded  to  the  crisis  by  improving  the  business
environment for foreign enterprises (World Bank,  1998). This has  further eroded Vietnam's
regional export competitiveness. Thus, coupled with the effects of the Asian crisis, Vietnam's
21relatively high minimum wage may reduce its attractiveness to  export-oriented  foreign
investors  and hold off some new investments.  Furthermnore,  our case study  in Haiphong  shows
that many foreign companies  are just one of several affiliates established  in different Asian
countries. This means that investors are able to quickly shift part of their production to
affiliates  in more competitive  countries.
Few investors, however,  seem  to complain  about labor costs, whose importance  must
certainly  be weighed  against the costs linked  to restrictive  foreign  exchange  regulations,  poor
infrastructure,  opaque  bureaucratic  procedures,  difficult  access  to land,  expensive  utilities  and
services,  unfavorable  business  laws, and -not the least- a certain  degree  of unpredictability  in
the Government's  policies  towards  foreign  investors.  Indeed,  labor costs  are only part of what
defines competitiveness.  There seems to be much scope in Vietnam  for cost-saving  reforms
other than those that reduce the purchasing  power of workers.  At less than $2 a day, labor
costs in Vietnam  remain  very low and attractive  by international  standards.
II.IL  Non-wage compensation
When minimum wages are high and enforced, payroll taxes to  finance non-wage
benefits  may further  increase  labor costs,  erode export  competitiveness  and hurt employment.
On the other  hand, if minimum  wages  are  poorly enforced  or set at levels  below market wages
market forces are likely to lead to a substitution  between  wages  with non-wage  compensation.
In such a case, non-wage  benefits  (or payroll  taxation)  usually  reduce take-home  pay without
substantially  affecting  labor costs (see Mclsaac and Rama, 1997 or Gruber, 1997). But here
again, the extent to which  such substitution  between  wages and non-wage  benefits  happens in
practice  depends  on the extent to which non-wage  benefits  can  be enforced.
a) The Regulations
The Labor Code  provides  for a certain  number  of non-wage  benefits.  In this area,  there
are no distinctions between  domestic  and foreign  invested companies.  Since the adoption of
the Labor Code in  1995, contributions  to the social insurance fund are mandatory in all
enterprises  that employ more than 10 workers: employees  must pay 5% of their wages and
employers  a further 15%  of workers'  wages.  For businesses  that employ  fewer than 10  people,
or for employees  with contracts shorter  than 3 month,  social insurance  allowances  have to be
directly included in take-home  pay. The social insurance fund benefits workers in case of
occupational disease, workplace accidents, maternity, retirement or for death allowances
(there is no unemployment  insurance  in Vietnam so far). The replacement  rate is generally
75% of wage levels.  In addition  to social  insurance,  employers  and employees  are also subject
to  mandatory health insurance: employers must contribute 2% of  workers wages and
employees 1%.
b) Evidence:
In Vietnam, compliance  with non-wage regulations is very poor. According  to data
from the Vietnam Social Security  (VSS), out of about  40 million workers  only 4 million are
covered by social insurance. And out of these 4 million, only 380,000 are private sector
workers. Such low compliance  is a typical problem in developing  countries, where too few
22inspectors with too few means cannot do much to enforce labor laws on a broad scale. At the
central level, VSS has currently 15 inspectors to make sure that companies and workers pay
their contributions. At  district level, VSS has on  average 6 full-time employees  to collect
revenues, distribute entitlements and inspect compliance. This is far too few to ensure the
application of the Labor Code's progressive provisions.
A  similar picture emerges from information collected  at firm  level. Evidence from
MPDF  (1999)  shows that  many  of the  country's  larger private  sector manufacturers  hire
workers  without signing any  contracts that require social insurance payments.  The survey
found that 6% of firms generally sign no contracts at all with their workers, while another
23%  of  firms  sign  only  daily  or  monthly  contracts.  Furthermore,  in  the  whole  private
manufacturing  sector,  seasonal  and  part-time  workers  (for  whom  no  social  security
contribution need to be made) represent around 30% of the total labor force. A case study in
Haiphong shows that among export-oriented manufacturers many companies appear to make
some contributions to  social insurance. But, here again, often less than  100 percent of the
workforce is covered. In addition, the level of contribution is often lower than stipulated by
the Labor  Code:  both  firms and  workers  agree  to  pay  respectively  15% and  5%  of the
mandatory minimum wage rather than of actual wages (Belser, 1999).
This suggests a low level of confidence in the social insurance system. In principle,
workers  should  have  an  incentive to  pay  their  contributions since  they  derive  important
benefits  in  case  of  workplace  accident,  occupational disease,  or  retirement.  In  practice,
however, workers appear to prefer a higher take-home pay. There are at least three reasons
that  can explain  such an attitude.  The first is the  fact that  pensions  are not adjusted  for
inflation.  For private  sector workers, the replacement rate of pensions  is 75% of nominal
wages. Thus, workers may expect their future benefits to be small in real terms. The second
reason,  is  the  low  level  of  confidence  workers  have  in  Vietnam's  new  social  security
institutions.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that workers perceive non-wage benefits  as a tax
rather than as an insurance against risk. The last reason has to do with workers low wages. It
has been observed in other countries that the demand for benefits typically grows with the
level of earnings. When income is low workers have little interest in benefits. They need cash
to pay for their basic needs (Filer et al., 1996). It is worth pointing out, however, that even in
high-income countries workers often resist social insurance contributions (although admitting
the necessity of such insurance mechanisms).
III.III.  Employment  termination and dispute settlement
Labor markets have an important role in the success of economic reforms by ensuring
labor  mobility.  To  exploit  its  comparative  advantage  in  labor-intensive  manufactures,
Vietnam  will have  to ensure the redeployment of workers from protected capital-intensive
public enterprises to sectors in which it has a comparative advantage. Job security and other
regulations that reduce employment flexibility tend to make such adjustment more difficult.
In addition, complex procedures for terminating employment and high mandatory  severance
payments tend  to discourage employers from hiring workers in the first place. In Vietnam,
issues of labor mobility are particularly important in State enterprises undergoing reforms or
equitization (i.e. privatization). But it also applies to joint ventures between State enterprises
and  foreign investors, where most workers are on life time contracts. If employment  levels
cannot be adjusted in these enterprises, such form of foreign investment may rapidly dwindle.
23a) Regulations
According to  the Labor Code, employment can be unilaterally terminated by the
employer  in case of "business  restructuring"  or "change  of technology",  provided  a severance
allowance of 1 month's salary for every year of service is paid to the terminated workers.
However,  when the need arises for a "massive  layoff', the employer  must discuss  each case
with the Executive Committee of the local trade union; if both parties agree, employment
termination become effective 30 days afler the local labor office has been notified. In
addition, unilateral employment  termination  is also possible without having to consult with
trade unions in case of "natural  disaster  forcing  the employer  to scale down production"  or if
"the  business  terminates  its operation".  Here,  the employer  must pay a severance  allowance  of
only one half month's  salary  for every  year  of service.
There are two types of labor disputes that may arise in the context of employment
termination:  those between  the employer  and the unions,  and those between  the employer  and
the individuals. Disputes between employers and unions must be  solved as  follows: a
company  with more than 10 employees  must set up a local "Labor Reconciliation  Council"
representing  both employers  and employees.  This council must propose an agreement;  if any
party does not accept  the agreement,  it can ask the provincial  "Labor  Arbitration  Council"  to
make a new proposal; if the union refuses this new proposal it can request the People's
Committee  of the Province  to settle the dispute  or stage a strike; if the employer does not
agree with the new proposal, it can request the People's Court to reconsider  the decision.
Disputes between employers  and individuals  are simpler: either party may directly ask the
People's Court to settle the dispute.  Thus, in such a case there is no need to form a "Labor
Reconciliation  Council"  nor can  there be any involvement  of People's  Committees.
b) Evidence
Most private sector  companies  hire workers  on very short-tern contracts.  This allows
employers to deal with labor redundancies  and adjust employment  levels within the legal
framework  by simply not renewing  contracts.  A case study in Haiphong shows  that most full-
time workers  in the private footwear,  garment  and food processing  sectors are on 6 months to
I year contracts, and that no employer ever had to reduce its labor force by breaking a
contract (Belser, 1999).  The MPDF survey (MPDF, 1999) shows that out of 95 interviewed
firms, only 20% sign more than 1 year contracts for most of their labor force and that a
majority  of the companies  sign 6 months  to 1 year contracts.
Foreign investors who have signed joint  ventures agreements with State-owned
enterprises  have less flexibility.  Usually,  most of their workers  are on life long contracts. The
story summarized  in the next section shows that although  the Labor Code establishes  a clear
procedure for employment termination and dispute settlement, such procedures remain
unfamiliar  in Vietnam.  In addition,  the case study brings to attention  the fact that unions can
ultimately  refer disputes over employment  termination  to the Provincial  People's  Committee.
This means that, in such cases, it is an executive branch of the Government which is
responsible  for interpreting  the Labor Code. This contrast  with countries  where Governments
can impose compulsory arbitration  through independent  courts. The procedure in Vietnam
thus resembles  the situation in Spain, for example, where collective dismissals require the
approval of the Ministry of Labor, which usually grants its approval only if unions agree.
24This, in turn, means that the only way to terminate employment is to offer high severance pay
to workers in order to induce the union's consent (Pencavel, 1996).
Related to the issue of who ultimately interprets the Labor Code is the question of how
the  Labor  Code  is  interpreted.  Under  exactly  what  conditions  and  circumstances  can
employment be terminated on the grounds of "business restructuring", "change of technology"
or "termination of business operation" ? The case study in the next section clearly shows how
a restrictive interpretation of the Labor Code by local authorities could substantially slow the
speed of reforms in the State sector and discourage foreign investment in joint ventures with
State companies.
c) A case study
ABB Transformers is a joint venture created in 1994 between ABB, a multinational
company which owns 65% of the joint venture's capital, and CTBT, a State-owned enterprise
under  the  Ministry  of  Planning  and  Investment.  The  company  manufactures  power
transformers  and  other  capital-intensive  electrical  equipment  for  the  Vietnamese  market.
Through the joint venture  agreement, ABB agreed that ABB Transformers would take over
474 State employees from CTBT. These workers were all on long term or life time contracts.
Due to low sales, ABB offered pre-retirement separation packages of about $4,000 to
more than  100 workers between  1996 and mid  1998, reducing its labor force  from 474 to
about 350. In September  1998, because of low sales, ABB decided to close down 2 of the
company's 4 business divisions and to retrench  another 67 workers. The company justified
employment termination on two of the Labor Code's provisions: "change in technology" and
"termination  of business  operation".  But  no  consultation  was  undertaken  with  the  labor
unions, nor was the local labor office notified 30 days in advance. In addition, some workers
were retrenched for allegedly poor health.
By  January  1999,  ABB  Transformers  proceeded  with  the  first  layoffs.  But  as
dismissed people protested  and as ABB realized that the company was breaking the Labor
Code's provisions  for  cases of  "massive layoffs"  it took  all  workers  back  on board.  The
company restarted the whole process again in March 1999. Consultation was undertaken with
the labor union, which  did not agree to the layoffs. And  as the dispute could not be settled
through the company's "Labor Reconciliation Council", the Ministry of Labour Invalids and
Social Affairs (MOLISA) was requested to formulate a new proposal. But before MOLISA
could make  any new proposal, the union staged a demonstration within the premises of the
company,  and  apparently  asked  Hanoi's  People's  Committee  to  settle  the  dispute.  Not
knowing  how  to  handle the  situation, the People's  Committee  asked  the Prime  Minister's
Office to take over the resolution of the dispute.
The Prime Minister's  Office decided to set up an inspection team to investigate the
issue  and  report  its conclusions  to the  Prime Minister.  This inspection  team produced  its
recommendations on the 16th  of August 1999. The document recognizes that the joint venture
is making losses but advises the Prime Minister's Office to take the following decision:
1) the company "is required to re-operate the  2 closed-down divisions for which  it
received an Investment license in order to create more jobs for the employees" (on the ground
that these two businesses were marginally profitable);
252) "the company is required to utilize all employees who were retrenched" and to
"limit (...)  the imports of simple mechanical parts in  order to  encourage the domestic
production";
3) the company "should  concentrate  on the quality of the products in order to reduce
the costs as well as the loss of the company";
4) the company "should  train the skill for its employees  so that they can work for the
company";
5) the company  should "strengthen  the financial  management  by finding  the way to cut
costs and making profit for the company,  in order to compensate  for the loss caused by the
management  of the company".
Among other considerations,  these conclusions  are based on the ideas that imported
second hand machines are not  "new" technology and that the termination of a  business
operation is illegitimate if the business is not incurring losses -thus dismissing the two
reasons ABB Transformers  invoked for terminating  employment  of the 67 workers.  A final
decision  is soon expected  by the Prime  Minister.
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Between  1992 and 1997,  Vietnam  was one of the fastest  growing  economy  in the world.
This growth was led by the industrial sector which expanded at 13%  per annum.  However,
Vietnam's strong manufacturing  growth has  only had a  moderate impact on industrial
employment,  which grew by 4% per annum. This represents  less than 30% of the rate of
industrial  growth. In stark contrast, Asian countries which followed  export oriented growth
strategies during the last three decades were able to raise industrial  employment  at annual
rates  close to 80%  of their industrial  growth.
One explanation  of this difference lies in the capital intensive and inward looking
nature of much of Vietnam's industrial sector, which is still dominated by State owned
enterprises concentrated in heavy industry. The surge of foreign direct investment into
Vietnam in the mid to late 1990s has not altered this situation to any significant  degree.
Although  the share  of foreign  capital flowing  into light industry  has increased  in recent years,
close to 90% of the stock of foreign investment  is still in capital-intensive  industries.  This
pattern of growth in large part reflects Vietnam's  high barriers to heavy industrial imports,
which not  only protect State enterprises but  also attracts foreign investors into import-
substituted  and capital-intensive  activities,  often  in joint ventures  with State  enterprises.
In the future, however, growth  promises  to be much more labor-intensive.  Between
1992  and 1997,  real export  earnings  increased  by an impressive  19%  per year and the share of
light manufactures  in total exports rose from 13.5%  to 36.7%. Had manufacturing  exports
earnings  continued  to grow at their pre-crisis  rates  Vietnam  might  have exported  an additional
$1.2  billion of light industrial  goods  and created  up to 300,000  manufacturing  jobs in 1998.
In addition, Vietnam's high human  capital  and its large supply of labor relative to land
suggest  that there is scope for significantly  raising manufacturing  exports in the near future
through a  better allocation of  resources. Cross-country statistical evidence shows that
Vietnam's untapped export potential represents  roughly 25% of its GDP and that up to 1.6
million  jobs could  be created  in the next few years through  labor-intensive  exports.  With high
export  growth  rates,  these  jobs could  be created  in the next 3 to 6 years.
The paper also shows  that current  regulations  regarding  minimum  wages and non-wage
benefits are unlikely to harm private sector development.  Their impact on foreign invested
companies  are, however,  more ambiguous.  For these companies,  the minimum  wage is above
market  wages and non-wage  benefits further  increase labor  costs. Whether  this deters  foreign
investment  or induces  a relocation  of production  to more  competitive  countries  is unclear.  The
presumption  is that at less than $2 a day, labor costs in Vietnam remain low and attractive.
Finally,  in  theory,  Vietnam's new  Labor  Code  ensures labor  mobility. Restrictive
interpretations  of the Labor Code may, however, deter foreign  investment  in joint ventures
and slow Vietnam's  adjustment  process from an inward  looking State-led  economy  to a more
market  based economy  specialized  along  the lines  of its comparative  advantage.
27Bibliography
Aaron,  Carl,  and  Teresa  Andeya. (1998).  "Foreign Direct  Investment and  Poverty
Alleviation",  Background  Paper, FIAS,  World  Bank,  (May).
ADB (Asian Development Bank). (1997), Emerging Asia: Changes and Challenges, Asian
Development  Bank Publication,  Manila.
Agrawal,  Nisha.  (1995).  "Indonesia.  Labor  Market  Policies  and  International
Competitiveness", Policy Research Working Paper 1515, World Bank, September.
Agrawal, Nisha. (1996). "The Benefits  of Growth  for Indonesian  Workers",  Policy  Research
Working Paper 1515, World Bank, August.
Belser, Patrick. (1999). "Labor Regulations in Vietnam's Export Sector: a  Case Study in
Haiphong",  unpublished.
Chenery H., and Syrquin M. (1975). Patterns of Development 1950-1970, New York, Oxford
University  Press.
CIE (Centre for International  Economics).  (1998), Vietnam's  Trade  Policies 1998, Canberra
and Sydney,  Australia  (July).
Datt, Gaurav,  and Martin  Ravallion.  (1996).  "Why Have Some  Indian States  Done Better
Than Others at Reducing Rural Poverty", Policy Research  Working Paper no 1594, World
Bank, April.
Economist  The. (1998). Pocket World in Figures, 1999 edition, Profile Books, London
Filer, Randall, Hamermesh,  Daniel, and Albert Rees. (1996). The Economics  of Work and
Pay, Sixth  edition, Harper  Colins,  New York.
Gillis, Malcom, Perkins, Dwight, Roemer, Michael, and  Donald  Snodgrass. (1987).
Development Economics, New York, Norton & Company.
Gruber,  Jonathan.  (1995).  "The  Incidence  of Payroll  Taxation:  Evidence  from Chile",  Journal
of Labor Economics 15(3), pp.172-101.
GSO (General Statistical  Office). (1998 and 1999a).  Statistical Yearbook,  Hanoi, Statistical
Publishing  House.
GSO (General Statistical Office). (1999b) Viet Nam Living Standards Survey 199  7-98, Hanoi,
Statistical  Publishing  House.
IMF (International  Monetary Fund). (1999). "Vietnam: Statistical Appendix", IMF Staff
Country  Report  No. 99/56, Washington,  D.C.,  July.
Krueger, Anne, 0. (1983). Trade and Employment in Developing Countries: 3 Synthesis and
Conclusions,  National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  University  of Chicago  Press, Chicago.
28Lipton, Michael. (1996). "How Economic Growth Affects Poverty", Background Paper for the
Human  Development  Report 1997,  Poverty Research  Unit, University  of Sussex, December.
MacIsaac,  Donna, and Martin Rama. (1997). "Determinants  of Hourly Earnings in Ecuador:
the Role of Labor  Market Regulations  ", Journal of Labor Economics  15(3),  pp.136-65.
Mayer, Joerg, and Adrian Wood. (1999). "South Asia's Export Structure in a Comparative
Perspective",  IDS Working  Paper 91.
Meier, Gerald M. (1995). Leading Issues in Economic  Development,  6th edition, New York,
Oxford  University  Press.
MPDF (Mekong Project Development  Facility). (1999). Vietnam's Under-sized  Engine: A
Survey of 95 Larger Private  Manufacturers,  International  Finance  Corporation,  (June).
Owens, Trudy,  and  Adrian  Wood. (1997). "Export-Oriented Industrialization Through
Primary  Processing?",  World  Development,  Vol.25,  No.9, pp.1453.
Pencavel, John. (1996). "Selected  International  Experience  Concerning  the Legal Framework
for Collective  Bargaining  and Unionism",  Unpublished, Stanford  University,  October.
Riedel, James,  and  Tran, Chuong S.  (1998). "The Emerging Private Sector and  the
Industrialization  of Viet Nam"; Report on the Project: Viet Nam's Emerging Private Sector
and Promising  Private Companies,  James Riedel and Associates,  Inc., April.
UNDP (United Nations Development Prograrnme). (1999a). Socio-Economic Statistical
Bulletin, Hanoi, Viet Nam, June.
UNDP (United  Nations Development  Programme).  (1999b). Completion  of Viet Nam's Legal
Frameworkfor Economic  Development,  Hanoi,  Viet Nam, March.
Wood, Adrian. (1994). North-South Trade, Employment  and Inequality;  Changing Fortunes
in a Skill-driven  World,  Clarendon  Press, Oxford.
Wood,  Adrian,  and  Joerg Mayer.  (1998). "Africa's Export Structure in  Comparative
Perspective", Economic Development  and Regional Dynamics in Africa: Lessons  from  the
East Asian Experience,  UNCTAD,  Geneva  (forthcoming).
Wood, Adrian and Kersty Berge. (1997). "Exporting Manufactures: Human Resources,
Natural Resources, and Trade Policy", The Journal of Development  Studies, vol.34, No.1,
October.
World  Bank. (1999). Vietnam  Development  Report  2000, forthcoming.
World  Bank. (1998). Vietnam  Rising  to the Challenge,  World  Bank Economic  Report.
29Appendix  I
Factor content  of Vietnam's  untapped  comparative  advantage
a) Direct employment  effect: an estimate
The number  of jobs created  in export  sectors (Zx) can be calculated  as:
Zx = X. (1I/Lx)
where X is the value of exports we are interested  in, and Lx is the (export  weighted)  average
output  per worker in export sectors. Given the estimates  shown in table 12, we can calculate
the number  of jobs created  through an additional  $6.5 billion of exports as
Zx = X .(l/Lx) = 6.5 billion . (1/4,078)  = 1,596,125  jobs
This indicates  that, through a better use of its comparative  advantage  in manufacturing
exports,  Vietnam  could create  around 1.6  million  new  jobs in export sectors.
How many  jobs would be lost in import-competing  sectors due to a $6.5 billion worth
of additional  imports? This is more difficult  to assess, mainly for two reasons.  The first is that
a large share of the increased imports will consist of intermediates for export production.
Such imports  do not displace any domestic  production.  The second reason is that many of the
remaining  imports do not compete  with existing  domestic industries.  Indeed, a large share of
developing countries' imports are typically more technology- and skill-intensive  than local
production (see Wood, 1994).  These goods are not direct substitutes  for domestic production
and their labor market 'effect  is difficult  to gauge.  It is assumed here that they consist mainly
of consumer  goods on which higher export earnings can be spent without adverse effect on
domestic production. Thus, the number of jobs lost due to increased imports (Zm) must be
calculated  as:
Zm = (M  - M* - Mnc) .(1/Lm)
where M is the value of imports,  M* is the value of imports  used as intermediates  in
exports,  Mnc is the value of remaining  imports  that are non-competing,  and Lm is the average
output  per worker  in import-substituting  sectors.
M*, the value of imports  used as intermediates  in exports, can be calculated  as:
M*  (Im/It) . (I/O .X)
where Im/It is the share of intermediates  in export  production  that are imported,  where
I/O is the share of intermediates  in the export sector's gross output, and X is total exports.
According to data from the Ministry of Finance, the cost of intermediate inputs represent
between 87% and 90% of gross output in garments and textiles and footwear. Anecdotal
evidence suggest that in private companies,  both domestic and foreign invested,  virtually all
of these inputs are imported. State enterprises,  on the other hand, tend to buy more domestic
internediates. Thus, assuming conservatively  that overall 50% of intermediates  are imported,
we can estimate  M* as follows:
M* = 0.5 . (0.9 . 6.5 billion) = 2.925 billion
30This  indicates that  $2.925 billion worth of  imports are  likely to  be  used  as
intermediates  in export  production.
Mnc, or the value of non-competing  imports  out of the remaining  imports,  is generally
estimated by comparing import data with data on domestic  production.  Krueger (1983), for
example,  defines  a statistic  Ti such  as: Ti = Ci-Pi/Ci,  where Ci is domestic  purchases  and Pi is
domestic  production.  A good is then usually  considered  as non-competing  if Ti > 0.75. That
is, if domestic  production  represents  only 25% or less of domestic consumption.  Vietnamese
data, however, makes  the use of such a method  impossible.  Based on international  evidence,
the share  of non-competing  imports  may  be conservatively  estimated  to make  up another  third
of imports that are not used in export production (see Krueger, 1983). Mnc may thus,
somewhat  superficially,  be estimated  as:
Mnc = (1/3) . (X - M*) = (1/3) . (6.5 billion - 2.925 billion) = 1.  19 billion
We can now calculate  the number of workers made redundant  due to a $6.5 billion
increase  in imports  (Zm)  as follows:
Zm = (M - M* - Mnc) . (I/Lm) = (6.5 b. - 2.925 b. - 1.19 b.) . (1/9,200) = 260,000
In other words, international  integration  and an efficient use Vietnam's comparative
advantage  would lead to about 260,000 redundancies  in State sector. Thus, the net forgone
employment  (Z) due to Vietnam's  untapped comparative  advantage  represents  roughly 1.34
million  manufacturing  jobs, calculated  as:
Z = Zx - Zm = 1, 596,125 - 260,000 = 1,336,269
b) Sensitivity  analysis
Of course, the above numbers are rough estimates. The methodology used above
involves  no sophisticated  counterfactual  (i.e. what else would be different if Vietnam was
able to export more manufactures).  This would tend to lead to an underestimation  of the
employment  effects of a more export-oriented  Vietnam, most importantly because open
countries  also grow faster  than nations  with few exports.  In addition,  these estimates  involve
several assumptions open to  discussion and debate. Table 15 shows how changes in the
model's  underlying  assumptions  affect  the above  results.
First, we experiment with different labor-intensity  coefficients  in Vietnam's export
sector. The estimates  presented  above are based on an average output per worker in export
industries  of $4,087.  While this may be a good approximation,  the true average may actually
lie somewhere  in the range  between  $3,885  and $4,300  (see table 12).  Row 3 of table 15 thus
indicates  that the lower and upper bound of the number of jobs created  through an additional
$6.5 billion or worth of exports  are respectively  1.5  and 1.7  million.
Similarly, row 4 provides a range of estimates  of the number of jobs lost due to
increased  imports.  The average  value refers to our estimate  that 45% of imports are used as
intermediates  in exports and that another  third of imports  are non-competing.  We find that the
number  of redundant  workers  is roughly  260,000.  The higher  estimates  assume  that only 40%
of imports  are intermediates  and that only 20%  of remaining  imports  are non-competing.  Here
31we find that the number of redundant  workers is 340,000. The lower estimates on the other
hand assume that 50% of imports  are intermediates  and that 40% of the remaining  imports are
non-competing.  In such a case, we find that the number  of redundant  workers  due to increased
imnports  is only 210,000. Thus, the true number of redundant workers as a result of deeper
international integration and a  better allocation of resources is  likely to  range between
210,000 and 340,000. Overall, these results indicate that the net positive labor market effect
from a better use of Vietnam's comparative  advantage lies somewhere  between 1.2 and 1.5
million  jobs, with a best estimate  of 1.34  million.
Table 15:  sensitivity  tests
Predicted  share  of  63
manufactures  (%)
Absolute  export  6.5 (25% of GDP)
shortfall  (billion  $)
Labor effect of exports  low  average  high
(million  workers)  +1.51  +1.6  +1.69
Labor effect of imports  low  average  high
(million  workers)  -0.21  -0.26  -0.34
Net effect  low  average  high
(million  workers)  +1.17  +1.34  +1.49
c) Indirect employment effects: a best guess
The above calculations only take into account jobs directly created in exports and
directly lost in import substituted sectors. According  to the information  used above, export
sectors import half of their intermediate inputs. The other half originates in the domestic
economy. If the production of these intermediate  goods have similar labor requirements  to
export sectors, this means that the expansion  of exports would indirectly create an additional
717,000  jobs. This is calculated  as:
Zxi = (Id/It) . (I/O . X) . (lI/Lx) = 0.5 . (0.9 . 6.5 billion) . 4,078 = 717,263
where Id/It is  the  share of  intermediates in  export production that  are  bought
domestically,  where I/O is the share of intermediates  in the export sector's gross output, X is
total exports, and Lx is the labor content  of domestic intermediates.  Thus, the total number of
jobs created both directly and indirectly  (Zxt) through an additional $6.5 billion of exports
would amount to about 2.3 million:
Zxt = Zx + Zxi = 1,596,125  + 717,263  = 2,313,388
Of course, the same argument can be made about the number of jobs lost due to
increased  imports.  There is no data available,-however,  on this sector's share of intermediates
in gross output nor on the amount of imported intermediates.  As a rule of thumb one may
guess that the total number of jobs lost both in capital-intensive State enterprises and in
companies that produce their intermediate inputs may amount to  roughly 1.5 times the
number of direct  jobs lost in import-substituted  companies.  That is:
32Zmt= 1.5 .Zm= 1.5 .260,000  = 390,000
This would leave a net positive  impact  of:
Zt = Zxt  - Zmt = 2,313,388  -390,000  = 1,923,388
In other words, taking into account indirect  jobs that result from export and import-
substituted  companies'  requirements  for intermediate  goods, we can estimate that a better use
of Vietnam's  comparative  advantage  in manufacturing  could create  up to 2 million  jobs.
33Appendix II
The  employment effect of the Asian crisis
As pointed out in section I of this paper, had light manufacturing exports continued to
grow at their five years average pre-crisis rate of 45% per year, Vietnarn might have been able
to  export an additional  $1.2 billion  of light manufactures in  1998 alone.  How many jobs
would  this  have  created?  We can  get  an estimation  by  using  the  factor  content  method
described in Appendix I.
The number ofjobs  created in export sectors (Zx) can be calculated as:
Zx  =X.  (1/Lx)
where X is the value of exports we are interested in, and Lx is the (export weighted)
average output per  worker in export sectors. Given estimations shown in table  12, we  can
calculate the number ofjobs  created through an additional $1.2 billion of exports as:
Zx = 1.2 billion.  (1/4,078) = 294,262
with a lower and an upper estimate (Zxl and Zxu) of respectively:
Zxl = 1.2 billion .(1/4,300) = 279,070
and  Zxl = 1.2 billion.  (1/3,855) = 311,284
This  indicates that  in  1998, without  the  Asian  crisis,  Vietnam  may  have  created
between 280,000 and 311,000 jobs in export sectors, with a best estimate of about 295,000.
How  many jobs  would  have  been  lost  due  to  a  $1.2  billion  worth  of  additional
imports? Remember that this must be calculated as:
Zm = (M - M*  - Mnc)  . (l/Lm)
where M is the value of imports, M* is the value of imports used as intermediates in
exports, Mnc is the value of remaining imports that are non-competing, and Lm is the average
output per worker in import-substituting sectors.
M*, the value of imports used as intermediates in exports, can be calculated as:
M* = (Im/It)  . (I/O . X)
where Im/It is the share of intermediates in export production that are imported, where
I/O is the share of intermediates in the export sector's gross output, and X is total exports. As
already pointed out in Appendix I, according to data from the Ministry of Finance, the cost of
intermediate inputs represent between 87% and 90% of gross output in garments and textiles
and footwear, and we can assume that overall 50% of intermediates are imported. Thus, we
can estimate M* as follows:
M% = 0.5  . (0.87.  1.2 billion)  = 313  million
34This  indicates that  $552 million worth of  imports would have been used  as
intermediates  in export  production.
In Appendix I, Mnc, or the value of non-competing  imports out of the remaining
imports, were estimated to  represent one third of imports that  are not used in  export
production.  Mnc may  thus be estimated  as:
Mnc = (1.2 billion - 522 million) . 0.3 = 226 million
We can now estimate the number of jobs that would have lost in import-competing
sectors  if the Asian  crisis had not existed  as:
Zm = (1.2 billion - 522 million - 226 million) . (1/9,200) = 49,000
Thus, given output per worker of $9,200  in import-substituted  sectors (see table 12),
we can estimate that the Asian crisis has preserved  about 50,000 workers from becoming
redundant  in State owned  enterprises.
Finally, the net negative  employment  effect of the Asian crisis in terms of foregone
industrial  employment  can be calculated  as:
Z =  Zx - Zm  = 294,000  - 49,000  = 245,000
In other words, the net number of manufacturing  jobs that have not been created
because  of the Asian crisis can  be estimated  to be equal to 245,000.  Of course,  these are rough
estimations,  which are dependent  on a certain number of debatable assumption.  They are
intended  to provide  an order of magnitude  rather  than exact  figures.
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